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NO. 40 JULY 2020 Introduction 
Improving Europe’s China Competence 
On the Significance of China Competence for German and European Policy on China 
Andrea Frenzel and Nadine Godehardt 
Dealing with China is not only about finding answers to urgent problems in politics, 
business, or technology. Rather, a system of European China competence must be 
established that ensures long-term capacity for action. It is crucial to locate this task 
at the nexus of foreign and education policy. The development of China competence 
through education should therefore be part of Europe’s China strategy. 
 
Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, atti-
tudes towards the Chinese government 
under Xi Jinping had already changed con-
siderably in Germany and Europe. A mean-
ingful example of this is the European 
Commission’s Strategic Outlook of 12 March 
2019, which no longer describes China as 
a developing country, but as a key global 
player and leading technological power. 
The European Commission emphasises that 
although China is a cooperation and nego-
tiation partner as well as an economic com-
petitor, it is also a systemic rival, primarily 
because of its government model. 
During the course of the Covid-19 pan-
demic, this critical attitude towards China 
has increased significantly in politics, the 
press, and the think tank community. It is 
linked to growing doubts about Beijing’s 
political credibility. This has not only been 
fuelled by the decision of the National 
People’s Congress to pass the national secu-
rity law for Hong Kong at the end of May 
2020, but also by a whole series of political 
events. Criticism of the actions of the Chi-
nese authorities at the beginning of the 
Wuhan pandemic is particularly pro-
nounced. 
On the one hand, China’s economic 
significance for Germany and Europe is 
increasing. On the other hand, however, 
there is growing uncertainty about the 
global activities of Chinese actors and the 
increasingly complex thematic contexts 
in dealing with China. The combination 
of the two has long revealed that more 
China competence is indispensable. The 
German government already responded 
to this realisation with the (now expired) 
“China Strategy of the Federal Ministry 
of Education and Research (BMBF) 2015–
2020”. However, the measures developed 
in this strategy primarily concern science 
and research. It is true that 11 interesting 
interdisciplinary projects have been devel-
oped at German universities since 2016 
within the framework of one funding meas-
ure. But the question remains as to what 
extent these funding lines can develop 
“a broader China competence in Germany”. 
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Nexus of Foreign and Education 
Policy 
Education and foreign policy are natural 
allies in developing China competence. In 
this context, it is therefore not productive 
to consider them separately. However, the 
federal structure of the education system 
in Germany must always be taken into 
account when promoting China compe-
tence, because the ministries of education 
and culture of the Länder (federal states) 
are the key to implementation. The first 
promising approaches to cooperation have 
already been made. A joint initiative by 
the BMBF, the Federal Foreign Office, and 
the Standing Conference of the Ministers 
of Education and Cultural Affairs of the 
Länder was launched in 2017. It supported 
the study “China kennen, China können” 
(2018), which was the first comprehensive 
survey of China competence in Germany. 
The study not only focused on science and 
research, but also on the current state of 
school education, which is at least as im-
portant as university-level education for a 
strategic approach. The “Working Group 
on China Competence in Schools and Edu-
cation” was associated with the aforemen-
tioned initiative. Based on the findings of 
the study, it developed recommendations 
for implementation in the two main types 
of schools in Germany: general and voca-
tional. At the end of 2019, a civil society 
actor, Stiftung Mercator, with the support 
of the initiative partners, set up an educa-
tion network to promote China competence 
in schools. Areas of focus are Chinese lan-
guage instruction, China as a subject topic 
in classes, and student exchange. 
The question now is how to proceed, 
and whether the efforts for more China 
competence should become much more 
strategic, and above all transnational. 
A deeper understanding of China requires 
even more direct and indirect engagement 
with the country. Only then will it be pos-
sible to develop effective instruments and 
a self-confident attitude that is based on 
reciprocity. The foundations for the promo-
tion of China competence must be laid not 
only at universities and in centres of excel-
lence, but also in society as a whole, and 
they must be anchored in the national – 
and especially the European – education 
sector. Without an intensive Europe-wide 
development of China competence across 
all sectors, it will not be possible to differ-
entiate between relations with China as a 
partner, competitor, and rival in Germany 
and, above all, in Europe in the long term. 
Capacity for Action through 
China Competence 
China competence in politics has a different 
focus than in economic or technological 
contexts. However, all variants are ideally 
based on a good command of the language, 
sound knowledge and expertise of China, 
and the ability to communicate intercul-
turally. 
Firstly, China competence stands for the 
ability to apply knowledge about China to 
a whole range of situations and to place 
specific problems in the broader context of 
policy on China. For example, experience 
in the economic sector with China usually 
remains sector-specific and is therefore 
not generally transferable to other areas. 
Secondly, intercultural competence is a 
necessary requirement to engage in dia-
logue, especially under conditions of sys-
temic competition. This should not be 
equated with mastering a bag of tricks or 
business etiquette, but above all includes 
the ability to reconstitute the horizon of 
interpretations in recognising the differ-
ences between the systems. A detailed look, 
for example, at the complex political func-
tioning of the state and party apparatus 
protects both against the influence of propa-
ganda campaigns and the oversimplified 
friend–foe scheme of “innocent” Chinese 
people on the one hand, and “cunning” 
party officials on the other. This helps in 
seeing things objectively and finding solu-
tions that do justice to the complexities of 
German-Chinese and European-Chinese 
relations and can also counteract growing 
levels of mistrust. 
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Thirdly, China competence must start 
with school education. University studies 
and vocational training as well as appro-
priately supported student exchange pro-
grammes can create well-founded China 
competence. These approaches are valuable, 
but they alone hardly contribute towards 
anchoring China expertise in society on a 
broad level. The number of first-year stu-
dents in Chinese studies has been declining 
for years – in 2016/17 the number was 
around 500 in Germany, even though there 
are more and more courses of study being 
offered in contemporary Chinese studies. 
The development is similar in the United 
Kingdom, for example. Vocational educa-
tion and training in Germany currently 
does not offer any additional Chinese-relat-
ed qualifications with language training 
that goes beyond a basic level. 
School Education As a Corner-
stone of China Competence 
The development of China competence 
must start with school education. Second-
ary-level education lends itself to this pur-
pose. Intercultural competence is the key 
objective of Chinese lessons at school. In 
recent years it has been expanded structur-
ally, albeit not significantly in terms of 
numbers. Here, precisely those skills are 
taught that are needed in Germany and 
Europe on a much broader societal basis: 
language skills (up to a level of independent 
language use if the course is of an appro-
priate duration) and substantial socio-cul-
tural orientational knowledge about China. 
However, the number of pupils attending 
Chinese courses in schools has remained 
low for years – around 5,000. By contrast, 
some 7 million pupils in general education 
schools in Germany learn English (the uni-
versal lingua franca), 1.4 million French, 
and as many as 464,000 Spanish. Hardly 
any use has been made so far of the poten-
tial of specialised instruction to teach the 
approximately 5.3 million secondary school 
pupils in Germany about China, for exam-
ple in the subjects of politics, geography, 
economics, or history. 
Last but not least, China competence in 
the school education sector must be devel-
oped financially and ideologically inde-
pendent of the Chinese state. Linguistic and 
cultural offerings from the Chinese side – 
in the sense of a cultural foreign policy, as 
pursued by Germany and many other coun-
tries – should be welcomed as a supple-
ment. However, European nations must 
claim responsibility for “basic education” 
themselves. Not only that: In solidarity 
with European Union (EU) member states, 
this basic education should be implement-
ed and financed at the European level, for 
example by setting up a “European Educa-
tion Fund for Chinese Literacy”. In this 
respect, too, European robustness cannot be 
developed by Germany alone, but through 
cooperation at the European level. Euro-
pean countries that are financially weaker 
are often not even able to offer chairs of 
sinology or language instruction at univer-
sities, let alone Chinese lessons in schools. 
Even though a complete inventory of the 
existing China competence in Europe is not 
yet available, there is likely at present not 
a single European country that can provide 
adequate educational opportunities with 
respect to China through its own national 
responsibility. In the medium term, this 
deficit will impair Europe’s capacity to act 
autonomously with regard to China. 
A European Education Initiative 
for China Competence 
Ultimately, therefore, it is not enough to 
focus solely on Germany in this matter. 
“China” has long since arrived in Europe and 
is becoming increasingly assertive and self-
confident. This is why Europe is looking for 
a common stance and a “more robust Euro-
pean strategy”, as the EU High Representa-
tive for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
Josep Borrell recently emphasised. Conse-
quently, promoting China competence is a 
challenge not only for Germany, but for 
Europe as a whole – whether in economic 
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or political negotiations, diplomacy and 
information-gathering, or in order to count-
er propaganda and disinformation. Even in 
the United States, the lack of China compe-
tence – and the dangers that may arise 
from this – are currently being discussed. 
Without the establishment of a sustain-
able, Europe-wide China competence sys-
tem and intensive promotion of it, there 
will be a lack of expertise on China in the 
foreseeable future. However, a European 
education initiative for China competence 
as part of Europe’s China strategy cannot, 
and should not, start with standards and 
binding structures, because education policy 
is the domain of the individual member 
states. However, the EU already has a broad-
based education platform with elements 
on which a China competence initiative 
could be based, for example the EU policy 
of multilingualism. Existing popular pro-
grammes such as Erasmus+ also do not 
limit the sovereignty of individual countries. 
A first sub-package should include the 
following fields of action: information, net-
working of actors, and intensive dialogues 
on China education in Europe with exam-
ples of good practice. The long-overdue 
assessment of Chinese language instruction 
in schools and universities throughout 
Europe should be part of this component. 
A few years ago, a project group of lan-
guage experts from various European coun-
tries, funded by the European Commission, 
worked on the Common European Frame-
work of Reference for Languages and its 
applicability to the Chinese language. 
A similar project could serve the network-
ing and exchange of information on Chi-
nese language instruction at the European 
level and develop viable structures for this 
purpose. 
The content of a second sub-package 
should be to design, implement, and evalu-
ate concrete offers with regard to educa-
tional and curriculum development and ex-
change formats. Conceivable, for example, 
are cooperations in which mixed groups of 
European students travel to China, and 
then in return meet with Chinese students 
in individual European countries. This 
model already works in a similar way for 
providers of individual exchanges, but it 
could be expanded considerably as part of 
an integrated EU project. Both packages 
together can establish a European education 
initiative for China competence and thus 
contribute towards strengthening the cohe-
sion of the EU and towards advancing Euro-
pean autonomy in dealing with China. 
 
Andrea Frenzel is Research Assistant at the Asia Division at SWP. 
Dr Nadine Godehardt is Deputy Head of the Asia Division at SWP. 
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